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Spec i a l  Fea tu re
Commentators on the Tibetan question regularly ex-press their anxiety over developments in the overalldemographic composition of Tibet within China. (2)
They point to the demographic imbalance (5.4 million Ti-
betans as against 1.25 billion Han Chinese, according to the
census taken in 2000), and are fearful of the siphoning ef-
fect of an empty western region from an overpopulated east.
The impact of the trains that have been running between
seven Chinese cities and Lhasa since 2006 is causing con-
siderable alarm in this respect. (3)
However, until now only the urban and suburban areas in
the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) seem to be undergo-
ing an influx of non-Tibetan peoples. The high plateau,
where mountain agriculture and pastoral grazing are prac-
ticed, has so far been preserved from immigration. If the
transformation of the countryside along Chinese lines is not
yet achieved, rural society since 2006 has nonetheless been
undergoing deep disruption at the local level, and this exam-
ple of a “schema projected onto the subsoil of social struc-
tures” (4) is modifying the lived space in a manner still poorly
understood. This disruption threatens to have a long-term ef-
fect on the structures of Tibetan identities, individual and
collective. In the name of the policy for building “socialist
new villages,” nomads are being settled and farmers re-
housed in order to speed up their transformation into mem-
bers of a rational, ordered, densely populated, and hygienic
rural existence, which is also to be entrepreneurial, thus
breaking with the traditional and still current way of life. 
Massive settlement campaigns have already been mounted
in the transhumant livestock raising areas outside the TAR.
There, going back to at least 2000, in the name of ecology (5)
or “development,” Tibetan herders have had to settle down
in new villages, (6) causing damage to their economic and so-
cial structures. The campaign launched somewhat later in
The “Socialist New Villages”
in the Tibetan Autonomous
Region
R e s h a p i n g  t h e  r u ra l  l a n d s c a p e  a n d  c o n t r o l l i n g  i t s  i n h a b i t a n t s ( 1 )
F R A N Ç O I S E  R O B I N
1. Since research in the Tibet Autonomous Region is a sensitive matter, and has been more
or less impossible since 2008, this article relies partly on official Chinese sources, print-
ed or electronic. The internet references in the footnotes were all checked on 24 May
2009.
2. “Tibet” is understood here as meaning the area of China with a Tibetan population,
which covers about 25 percent of the total landmass of China. The most recent census
(2000) showed 2.4 million Tibetans in the Tibet Autonomous Region, 1.3 million in
Sichuan, 1.1 million in Qinghai, 0.4 million in Gansu, and 0.13 million in Yunnan. This
means that over half of the Tibetan population lives outside the borders of the TAR.
3. The trains between Beijing and Lhasa run once a day, while from Guangzhou, Chengdu,
Chongqing, Xi’an, Lanzhou, and Xining they run once every two days.
4. Pierre Bourdieu and Sayed Abdelmalek, Le Déracinement: La crise de l’agriculture tra-
ditionnelle en Algérie, Paris, Minuit, 1964, p. 152.
5. “Many policy-makers and development workers have adopted a generic, globalised
view of Tibet’s pastoralists, wherein livestock numbers are too high - the result of ‘illog-
ical’ and ‘backward’ practices. (...) Backed by scientific language and reasoning, state
planners use the discourse of land degradation as a pretext to impose technological
fixes that result in increased social control.” Ken Brauen, “Development and Enclosure
in Pastoral Tibet Since the 1980s,” in Nomadic Peoples, 9, 1 & 2, 60. 
6. At the end of 2008, the Xinhua News Agency announced in these terms the settlement
over four years of 90 percent of the 533,000 Tibetan pastoral nomads in Sichuan
(“470,000 herds people in Sichuan to move into brick houses,” 12 October 2008,
http://eng.tibet.cn/news/today/200810/t2008 1012_431903.htm). 
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The intention behind the establishment of the “socialist new villages” in the Tibet Autonomous Region (2006-2010) is
to relocate 50 to 80 percent of the rural inhabitants, whose farming and pastoral practices are considered “backward”
and “unscientific.“ In theory, this policy is aimed at bringing about a “hygienic” and “entrepreneurial” countryside.
There is little doubt that this vast social project, which has been little studied up to now, will have far-ranging
repercussions on rural life in Tibet.
The “Socialist New Villages” in the Tibetan Autonomous Region
the TAR (in 2006) seems likely to have a similar negative
impact, since it will affect both the herders and the domi-
ciled on a vast scale and within a very short space of time.
This article is an initial report on this huge resettlement
movement and will present its possible consequences.N ati ona l  and re gio nal  p oli c ie s
On several occasions in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury, the Chinese state has shown its willingness to remould
rural society, such as during the Great Leap Forward (1958-
1960), for example, through setting up production teams and
people’s communes. Settlement policies aimed at the no-
mads were likewise established as early as the Second Five-
Year Plan (1958-1962) in Inner Mongolia. (7) They con-
sisted of turning pastoral lands over to agriculture, and mak-
ing big reductions in the size of herds. (8)
The year 2000 saw the launch of the “Great Development
of the West” (Xibu da kaifa), aimed at the industrial and in-
frastructural development of the poor rural areas of Western
China, including Guizhou and Inner Mongolia. (9) Although
it had little immediate impact on the social structures in the
countryside, it laid the basis for further changes. (10) More-
over, back in 2002 Hu Jintao called for a “harmonious soci-
ety” to reduce the gap in the standard of living between the
cities and the countryside, which is a potential source of so-
cial unrest. (11) Three years later, a directive from the 5th ple-
nary session of the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist
Party called for building a “new socialist rural life,” (12) and
this line was confirmed shortly afterwards at the “National
Working Conference on Agricultural and Rural Policy.” (13)
The Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) extended this ap-
proach by setting up the new villages as a step towards
“modernity”: “Building socialist new villages is a major his-
torical mission in China’s modernization process.” (14) What-
ever the reality of its current implementation in China, this
policy is fully underway in the TAR. Following a pilot proj-
ect launched in 2005 that provides for 2,000 houses to be
built in Tolung Dechen (in the Lhasa urban area), the pol-
icy began to be officially and zealously applied in the follow-
ing year. But the TAR has four major features that distin-
guish it from the rest of the country: it has a mountainous
countryside, very low population density (three inhabitants
per square kilometre, as opposed to 130 in China), a low
rate of urban settlement (13 percent in the TAR as against
31 percent for the whole of China in 2000), and the wide-
spread practice of high mountain agriculture and pastoral
herding. We do not know whether these differences were
taken into account in the plans for Tibet. The hasty imple-
mentation of the official policy may be explained by the
leadership’s desire for a rapid reduction in the income gap,
which is particularly acute between the towns and the coun-
tryside in the TAR. (15) A more probable explanation is that
the Tibetan leaders tend to be all the more zealous in their
implementation of central government directives, because
since 1991 there have been doubts over their loyalty. (16)
I would add that by 1994, at the regional level, the third
“Working Panel on Tibet” (Beijing) had already established
“housing projects for needy farmers and herdsmen.” (17) In
addition, 40,000 herdsmen were permanently settled be-
tween 2001 and 2005 in Lhasa, Shigatse, Chamdo,
Nagchu, Ngari, and other towns at the prefectural level. (18)
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7. Cf. David Sneath, Changing Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese
State, Oxford, OUP, 2000, p. 84.
8. See Uradyn E. Bulag, “Inner Mongolia: The Dialectics of Colonization and Ethnicity
Building,” in Morris Rosabi (ed.), Governing China’s Multiethnic Frontiers, Seattle,
University of Washington Press, 2004, pp. 87 ff.
9. On this see David S. Goodman, “The Politics of the West: Equality, nation-building and
colonization,” in François Godement (ed.), La Chine et son occident, Paris, IFRI, 2002, pp.
23-55. This article can be consulted at http://www.governance.qub.ac.ok/
schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/InstituteofGovernance/Publications/briefingpapers/Filet
oupload,47661,en.pdf.
10. “The construction of Tibet is a part of the strategy of western regions’ development. The
preparation of western regions’ development (...) also created good conditions for
Tibet’s rural construction and provided more investments to it.” Anon., “Rural construc-
tion, the base of Tibet’s anti-poverty. Rural Reconstruction: the Basis of Inscreasing (sic)
Tibetan Farmers and Herdsmen’s Income and of Fighting Poverty in Tibet (II),” China
Tibetology, 2003, http://www.tibet.cn/english/zt/Tibetology/Magazine/.. percent5C
TibetologyMagazine/20031200531101051.htm.
11. See “Farmers’ Self-decision Right inn (sic) New Countryside Construction: An Interview
with Lu Xueyi, a Specialist on Rural Issues,” http://211.167.236.236/zt/maga-
zine/200402007412143426.htm. This decision gave rise to the publication of a docu-
ment entitled “Suggestions of the Party Central Committee and the State Council on
pushing ahead with the Construction of a New Socialist Countryside and Suggestions of
the State Council on Solving Problems Relating to Farmer Labourers.”
12. Trade, Agriculture and Development, OECD, 2006, p. 156.
13. On the topic of building a harmonious society, see the special issue of China
Perspectives, no. 3, 2007.
14. “Building socialist new villages,” 30 September 2007, http://english.people
daily.com.cn/90002 /92169/92211/6275027.html.
15. According to official Chinese statistics, the differential ratio was 4:1, compared with
3.3:1 for the national average. Although this had fallen in comparison with 2003 (4.8:1
and 2.7:1, respectively), it rose between 2006 and 2007. Source: “High cost, urban-rural
imbalance obstacles to Tibet’s future development: report,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/2009-03/31/content_11105836.htm. However, the prosperity gap within the vil-
lages seems to have grown appreciably. Thus M. Goldstein, G. Childs, and P. Wangdui
(“‘Going for Income’ in Village Tibet: A Longitudinal Analysis of Change and Adaptation,
1997-2007,” Asian Survey, XLVIII, 3, May-June 2008, 527) show that within ten years in
the villages under study, the gap between the poorest 20 percent and the richest 20 per-
cent grew from 1:8 to 1:12. So, even if the gap between villages and towns is narrowed,
the rural poor remain desperately poor.
16. See R. Barnett, “Beyond the collaborator-martyr model,” in Barry Sautman and June
Teufel Dreyer (eds.), Contemporary Tibet: Politics, development, and society in a disput-
ed region, London, M.E. Sharpe, 2006, 48.
17. “Most of Tibetan people have house property”, 4 February 2009, http://eng.tibet.cn/
index/news/ 200902/t20090204_457031.htm.
18. “China’s Tibet Fact and Figures,” art. cit.
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The “socialist new villages” therefore seem integral to the
pursuit of these regional policies.Som e fac ts  and f igure s
The mastermind behind the “socialist new villages” in the
Tibet Autonomous Region is Zhang Qingli, who has been
the TAR Party Secretary since 2005. If his project goes ac-
cording to plan, somewhere between 50 and 80 percent of
rural Tibetans in the TAR will be re-housed or relocated
under the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010 (19)). Other
sources mention 100 percent. (20) Even with the lower target
figure of 50 percent, this policy means the total disruption of
the social network in the countryside, affecting nearly all Ti-
betans in the TAR. (21)
Officially, this campaign is well underway: nearly 900,000
people are reportedly re-housed or resettled already
(290,000 in 2006, 280,000 in 2007, (22) and 312,000 in
2008 (23)). The projected figure for 2009 stands at about
1.32 million people, or 220,000 households. (24) The 50 per-
cent benchmark for affected rural inhabitants in the TAR
will therefore probably be surpassed a year before the in-
tended date, which means that the 80 percent target could
well be achieved by the end of 2010.
We do not know at present whether these figures reflect the
real situation or are just symptomatic of the “familiar bureau-
cratic pathologies” (25) afflicting local officials, who are always
quick to embellish statistics. However, for several years now,
the new uniform villages, visibly aligned along the main
roads with their red flags flapping on the rooftops, have tes-
tified to the rapid progress of this policy.
Its overall costs have been revised upwards as the years go
by. Overall investments are in the region of 2.5 to 3.5 billion
yuan per year. (26) A total sum of 15 billion yuan is to be
spent on reshaping the rural landscape, of which 80 percent
will come from public funds. The regional government has
taken on board an increasing amount of the expenditure:
390 million yuan in 2006, 465 million in 2007, and 680 mil-
lion in 2008, (27) with a projected figure of 710 million yuan
for 2009. (28) The leadership of the TAR seems determined
to take this campaign right through to the end.The  re -house d a nd set t le d  po pul at ions
These new villages are intended for three groups: the vulner-
able (impoverished or sick (29)), borderland dwellers, and
other rural groups (farmers and herdsmen). These peasants
can either renovate their housing, or destroy it in order to re-
build in another place deemed more appropriate, usually
along a road; or else they can buy a new house. (30) The wan-
dering herdsmen must settle down into the new housing
after selling their livestock. 
The only figures available for the proportions of the popula-
tion concerned refer to the first half of 2006. At that time
55 percent of those affected were farmers, 20 percent were
herdsmen, 15 percent were the impoverished and the sick
(13 percent and 2 percent respectively), and 11 percent
were borderland dwellers. At that time, projected figures for
2007 aimed at an increase in the proportion of farmers (65
percent), and a distinct decrease for herdsmen (8 percent).
Other categories were to remain roughly the same. So, start-
ing from a social perspective in 1994, matters then moved on
19. “Party Chief Brings Tibet New Homes,” China Daily, 15 March 2007, http://www.
china.org.cn/english/government/203051.htm and “China’s Tibet Fact and Figures:
People’s Livelihood,” 29 December 2006, http://en.tibet.cn/newfeature/xzt_2006ssysj_
rmshshbz/t20061229_194559.htm. See also Penkyi, “Comfortable housing and happy
lives of Tibetan farmers and herders,” China’s Tibet, 19, 1, 2008, pp. 4ff; “Tibet to allo-
cate US$ 62 Mln for low-cost housing,” 22 March 2008, http://en.china gate.cn/devel-
opment/2008-03/22/content_13294964.htm.
20. Perhaps this should be taken to mean 100 percent of the rural inhabitants, since these
represent around 85 percent of the population.
21. The rural population in the TAR is 98 percent Tibetan. The remaining 2 percent is made
up of mixed populations of Tibetans and Tibetan-speaking others (Sherpas, Mons etc.).
22. See for example “Population rises 180 pct in Tibet with lifespan up 31.5 yfears (sic),” 6
May 2008, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6405229.html, and
“Tibet to Allocate,” art. cit.
23. “310,000 Tibetan rural people to celebrate Tibetan Losar in new houses,” 12 February
2009, http://eng.tibet.cn/index/photo/200902/t2009020212_452148.htm. This figure is
higher than the original forecast (52,000 households) given in “Tibet to Allocate” (art.
cit.). According to another source, the period from 2006 to 2008 saw the settlement or
housing of 170,000 families, i.e. 860,000 individuals (“Change of living conditions in
Tibet,” 20 February 2009, http://eng.tibet.cn/index/news /200902/t20090220_
453853.htm.
24. “Tibet to bolster agricultural, animal husbandry in 2009,” 11 February 2009,
http://eng.tibet.cn/news/ today/200902/t20090211_451880.htm.
25. James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition Have Failed, New Haven, Yale University Press, p. 263.
26. In August 2008, the Xinhua News Agency announced that total costs for 2006-2007
amounted to 7 billion yuan, or 3.5 billion annually. As for the shared costs between the
various fund providers: in 2006, the only year for which information is reported, 58 per-
cent (1.44 billion yuan) came from “public” sources, 16 percent (390 million) was allo-
cated by the TAR, 5 percent (120 million) came from local authorities (prefectures and
counties), 3 percent (75 million) came as “public donations,” and 18 percent (400 mil-
lion) were bank loans (Penkyi, “Comfortable housing and happy lives of Tibetan farmers
and herders,” art. cit.).
27. “Change of living conditions in Tibet,” art. cit.
28. “Tibet to bolster,” art. cit.
29. People suffering from Kashin-Beck or “big bone” sickness, the cause of which is still not
clear but is sometimes attributed to unclean water.
30. “Those [former inhabited sites] with thick soil and good irrigating conditions are used
as farmlands while other lands not so fitful are transformed into woods land” (“Housing
project brings tangible benefit,” 4 August 2008, http://english.chinatibetnews.com/
news/Society/2008-08/04/content_136086. htm). The “ecological” theme of reforesta-
tion also plays a role in this campaign, even though it is not often put forward in the offi-
cial sources consulted for this article.
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to a global reshaping, with aims quite other than a simple re-
duction in rural poverty. (31)T he  “ so cia li st  new  v il la ges ”
At the national level, the “socialist villages” are proclaimed
as the precondition for “developed production, well-off life,
civilized rural customs, a neat and tidy appearance of village
and democratic management.” (32) In the TAR, there are four
main areas of concern.
W ell- bein g,  h y gien e,  an d t he  r eor gan is ati on  of  l iv in g s pa ce
The project’s principal justification is the provision of com-
fort for all. In fact, contradicting the repeated announce-
ments of material progress since “Liberation” followed by
the “democratic reforms” in Tibet, rural life there is far from
providing guaranteed access to public services. By the com-
pletion of the current project all rural housing should be con-
nected to running water. Official figures report that in 2000,
only 12 percent were connected, and in 2008 that figure was
61 percent. (33) Electricity supplies are to be installed for 90
percent of the population, as against 20 percent of the vil-
lages in 2003. While in that same year, one third of the vil-
lages could be reached by road, by 2010 that figure should
reach 80 percent. In pursuit of this policy for extending serv-
ice provision, the people’s living space has had to be relo-
cated at strategic points, particularly along the roadsides.
Among its other goals, this method is aimed at reducing the
costs arising from the local topography and the dispersed na-
ture of traditional dwellings. This kind of “well intentioned”
approach is well known. One example is the so-called “vil-
lagisation” of Tanzania in the 1970s. There a similar policy
ended in failure because of its high social and human costs,
and the rapid disruptions of the traditional way of life that it
brought about. (34)
In the thinking of the central authorities, the regrouping of
sections of the population is in accordance with the needs of
hygiene and healthy living. They consider the villagers to be
dirty and living in unhealthy conditions because of the co-
habitation of humans and animals: “The lack of planning in
construction of houses and roads and the dirty environments
have a negative impact on villagers’ clothing and mental atti-
tude.” (35) No doubt the authorities hope that their transfor-
mations will lead to support for their policy and the emer-
gence of a new “vision of the world,” thanks to the peasants’
discovery of hygiene and personal well-being.
In addition, the new villages built in straight lines satisfy the
“ultra-modernity” of official aesthetics (36) by remedying the
apparently chaotic dispersal of Tibetan farms. This relation-
ship between the organisation of human space and rational-
ity is reminiscent of the grandiose projects imposed on the
Soviet Union, or on Algeria at the time of its colonisation. (37)
L ea vin g ec on omic  au tar c hy  beh in d
The thinkers behind the project believe that access to hy-
giene and public service (roads, telecommunications, water,
electricity, and telephones) will help change mentalities and
foster a spirit of enterprise among the peasants and nomads.
In their view the nomads lead a “primitive” life and are
“bound by traditional concepts, for example, they were con-
tent with self-sufficiency, and did not know how to make
money by selling their domestic animals.” (38) The measure of
the success of this “bet” on the future is that by 2010 aver-
age individual earnings should rise to 3,580 yuan, (39) com-
pared with 2,788 yuan in 2007 and 3,170 yuan in 2008. (40)
But we can be sure that if this goal is reached, it will not be
solely due to a new way of living or a new mental outlook,
but to a trend that has been clearly visible for several years.
In three villages in the TAR that were studied over the pe-
riod from 1997 to 2007, (41) non-agricultural income grew reg-
ularly, and by 2005 it represented more than two thirds of
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31. Yet the rural inhabitants of Tibet are among the poorest in China: “If the provincial pover-
ty rates are in any way comparable, the TAR rates were higher than those of Qinghai up
to 1999, and likely the highest in the country.” Andrew Fischer, State Growth and Social
Exclusion in Tibet: Challenges of Recent Economic Growth, Oslo, Nias Press, 2005, p. 104.
32. “Building socialist new villages,” art. cit.
33. “China invests 953 mln yuan for safe drinking water in Tibet,” 29 January 2009,
http://eng.tibet.cn/ index/news /200901/t20090129_449689.htm.
34. Scott, op. cit., p. 223 ff.
35. “Rural construction, the base of Tibet’s anti-poverty,” art. cit.
36. Scott characterises this aesthetics as “the mastery of nature (inc. human nature), and
above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific under-
standing of natural laws,” op. cit., pp. 4-5.
37. Scott gives many examples of this. See also, Bourdieu & Sayad, Le Déracinement, 
op. cit., p. 151, for the plan to regroup Aïn Aghbel in Algeria.
38. “Northern Tibet grassland takes on new look,” 19 May 2009, http://eng.tibet.cn/
news/today/200905/ t20090519_477226_1.htm.
39. http://eng.tibet.cn/news/today/200901/t20090120_448675.htm.
40. “2008: 312,000 rural Tibetans to move into new houses,” 5 January 2009, http://
eng.tibet.cn/index/ news/200901/t20090105_446552.htm.
41. Goldstein, Childs, Wangdui, “Going for Income,” art. cit., pp. 526-527.
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New Villages, Kongpo, Nyingtri 
(Ch. Linchi) Prefecture, TAR. 
© All rights reserved.
total income, as compared with less than one third in 1997.
So Tibetan peasants are already fully occupied in searching
for non-agricultural income, and that is reflected in the
growth of their overall income. 
This “significant paradigm shift” (42) is therefore not directly
connected with current policies, or with the development
of new entrepreneurial attitudes. It is, rather, a response to
the need to survive by adapting to altered conditions: the
market prices for Tibetan agricultural products (barley and
wool) have not followed the rise in current prices for con-
sumer goods; the amount of exploitable land per person
has fallen; and the construction boom arising from the poli-
cies for developing the TAR has caused a massive demand
for unskilled labour. Although the majority of non-agricul-
tural jobs are already being done by unskilled Tibetan
peasants (employed for the most part on building sites),
there are some cases, of course, where an enterprising
spirit can be seen to generate income, and the press hur-
riedly reports on these. For example, Bu Norbu (Nagchu)
has founded a yoghurt co-operative. (43) Dawa Dondrub
(Nyingtri) has started a prosperous agricultural foods busi-
ness (garlic, colza, nuts, peppers), (44) and in 2004,
Phuchung (Shigatse) started the first Tibetan horticultural
co-operative. (45) We should note in passing that the first
and third of the above businesses are co-operatives, where
the well-being of the community takes precedence. As
Dawa puts it: “The core of Buddhism is to be benevolent.
But if you are poor, how could you help others?” (46) But
such success stories are rare. They should not hide the dif-
ficulties faced by the majority in adapting to the demands
of an economy based on the pursuit of profit and the de-
velopment of agri-businesses. The herders seem to be no
better prepared: “The rosy picture painted in government
publications concerning the boons of ‘unleashing’ market
forces only faintly applies to the situation of most Tibetan
pastoralists. They continue to produce very much along his-
torical lines, particularly in terms of technology, herd com-
position and culling practices.” (47)
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42. Goldstein, Childs, Wangdui, ibid., p. 517.
43. “Northern rural Tibetans: New concept of life,” 13 May 2009, http://eng.tibet.cn/
news/today/ 200905/t20090513_476016.htm.
44. “Native entrepreneur seeks to spread wealth in Tibet,” 17 March 2009, http://
eng.tibet.cn/index/ news/200903/t20090317_462327.htm.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ken Bauer, “Development and Enclosure,” art. cit., p. 59. The report, No-one has the
Liberty to Refuse (op. cit., p. 68ff), contains testimony by herders from the Sershul region
(Sichuan) who protested against the opening of slaughterhouses in the name of
Buddhist principles.
Construction of a new house, Kongpo, TAR. 
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The documents consulted for this article rarely mention the
“border people,” although they represent a tenth of those af-
fected. But elsewhere this programme has been called “re-
viving and enriching in the frontier areas.” (48) In 2009, the
government of the TAR planned to invest 1.6 billion yuan
for the “economic and social development of its border
areas,” with an emphasis on trade, the environment, and se-
curity. (49) We may recall that, before his posting to the TAR,
Zhang Qingli was in charge of the “Xinjiang Production
and Construction Corps,” which co-ordinates the clearing
and exploitation of land in that large sensitive region of
Western China, uniting defence with economic interests:
Over 45 years of development, our Corps has edu-
cated and trained troops for labour and defence
whose members [...] are able to fight tirelessly and
struggle with unflagging commitment to overcome the
enemies of the country. That is why in the great de-
velopment of the West, our Corps will be able to play
a leading role in economic construction, in strengthen-
ing national unity and social stability, and in reinforc-
ing our border defences. (50)
There are probably underlying security reasons being ap-
plied here. In this sensitive region, which is causing the Chi-
nese government a lot of anxiety, from now on any inhabi-
tants clearly domiciled in regular village units can easily be
put under surveillance, and their comings and goings can be
tracked. Infiltration by outside elements will be made more
difficult. Here again there is a parallel to be drawn with the
colonisation of Algeria: in 1845, Captain Richard recom-
mended a similar regrouping of the Algerian people:
[They are] everywhere and yet nowhere. The essen-
tial point is to get them within our grasp. When we
hold them, we will be able to do many things that are
impossible for us at the moment, and that will perhaps
enable us to gain control over their minds after gain-
ing control over their bodies. (51)
Finally, one of the endlessly repeated aspects of the cam-
paign is the implantation of cells for “rural democracy” in
the shape of “village committees.” A report published in
2003 recommended linking rural construction with the
need to “enhance the role of Communist Party’s basic or-
ganization of the village. The village’s Party branch commit-
tee and village community committee should play a van-
guard and core role in mobilizing villagers to build their
homeland.” (52)
So the Party does not envisage a lessening of its role in the
villages, but sees it being strengthened. In addition, electric-
ity for all will allow state media to be present in every vil-
lage: “Television (...) is an effective means of changing
their old ideas, broadening their vision and readjusting their
behaviour.” (53) It is also the means of building the nation. In
the case of Tibet, there is the additional need to struggle
against Tibetan stations broadcasting from abroad and eas-
ily picked up by small battery radios (Radio Free Asia,
Voice of America, Voice of Tibet). F uture  pr osp e cts
I n cr eas ed pover ty?
The families targeted by the plan will be pushed heavily into
debt. The average cost of a house is 60,000 yuan. From the
regional government a farmer receives 10,000 yuan, a pas-
toralist 15,000 yuan, and an indigent 25,000 yuan. (54) The
local governments also provide support grants. If 20 to 50
percent of the costs are financed by the authorities, 50 to 80
percent will have to be financed by the Tibetans themselves
(except for the very poor, who mostly receive support). That
spells serious indebtedness (from 30,000 to 40,000 yuan)
for households in which individual income is scarcely 3,000
yuan per year and saving is impossible. Admittedly, the con-
struction boom is offering unskilled peasants many opportu-
nities for work on the building sites, but this argument only
applies to short-term prospects; when the TAR has been re-
shaped and the roads completed, the employment cornu-
copia for the unskilled may well run out. Logically, this mas-
sive indebtedness ought to redirect the rural inhabitants to-
wards more lucrative occupations. But only 15 percent of Ti-
betans have academic qualifications above secondary school
48. Penkyi, “Comfortable housing,” art. cit.
49. “Tibet to boost development of border areas,” 25 March 2009, http://eng.tibet.cn/
news/today/ 200903/t20090325_464442.htm.
50. Interview with Zhang Qingli in People’s Daily, 10 November 2002, translated from the
French version, http://french.peopledaily.com.cn/628104.html. On this “Xinjiang
Production and Construction Corps,” see James D. Seymour, “Xinjiang’s production and
construction corps and the Sinification of Eastern Turkestan,” Inner Asia, vol. 2, no. 2,
2000, pp. 171-194.
51. Quoted in Bourdieu & Sayad, Le Déracinement, op. cit, p. 27 (tr.).
52. “Rural construction,” art. cit.
53. Ibid.
54. “Party Chief Brings Tibet New Homes,” art. cit.
Spec i a l  Fea tu re
level, the rate of illiteracy in both town and countryside in
2001 was 45 percent, (55) and most Tibetans have only a rudi-
mentary knowledge of Chinese. Being defenceless in the
face of competition from the better equipped immigrants,
they are in danger of simply swelling the ranks of the urban
poor.
There is another effect, which has certainly not escaped the
notice of the authorities, namely that the high level of in-
debtedness is likely to lessen the sums donated to the monas-
teries, which are often considered hotbeds of nationalism.
Th e c omplete  d isr u ptio n  of  r u ra l  l i f e  inTi bet
Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad emphasise “the in-
terdependence that unites the structural organisation of
space, the structure of social groups, and the type of social
relations.” (56) The planned process of uprooting in the TAR
is going to produce a sudden disruption in the present way
of life. This will in turn bring about restructuring of various
sorts, and adjustments in patterns of movement, customary
rhythms, and ways of social interaction, not to mention a
complete alteration of the way of life itself. Consciousness
and collective memory, linked to sites and the landscape, will
also be transformed. Yet there is never any official reference
to these problems, or to the impact on day-to-day religious
life. How will the new village centres organise their relation-
ship to the local temples and monasteries, which are the real
centres of the life of the community? How will the cults of
the earth divinities be conducted?
The transition phase for the herders will be even harsher, as
they move from mobility to complete immobility. (57) From a
Han point of view, settlement appears as a step in the
progress towards civilisation, as is shown by the title of an ar-
ticle in the official press: “No longer roaming.” (58) But for
those affected, becoming rooted into a fixed settlement is ac-
tually being uprooted, through a brutal break from a cen-
turies old mode of life, and is a probable cause of traumatic
disorders.
Fr eedom o r c oer cio n ?
There is very little consideration given to the question of the
population’s participation in these changes, except only to af-
firm that there is no coercion. (59) For example, we are told
of the 7,000 herdsmen removed from the source of the
Yangtze, and of the several dozen families living on the Hoh
Xil reservation, that:
The relocation is in line with the will of the herdsmen, not
a forced one (...) Most of the new houses in the pasture
lands were built where the farmers and herdsmen were al-
ready living. (60)
But Human Rights Watch asserts the opposite to be true,
and they are supported by numerous witness statements. (61)
According to R. Barnett, the relocation and settlement proj-
ect in the TAR is “forced, heavily regulated ... without the
normal safeguards of consensus and consultation.” (62) The
few testimonies by refugees in France confirm that coercion
is the key to mass participation in the project. Even without
the systematic employment of force, it can at least be af-
firmed that this campaign does not arise in the first instance
from the interested parties themselves. 
Con tr oll i n g th e  p eopl e?
As James Scott shows, the State always seeks to dismantle
and recompose societies that evade its comprehension, be-
cause the latter are actually “a hindrance to any effective in-
tervention by the State, whether the purpose of that interven-
tion is plunder or public welfare.” (63) Life in the Tibetan
countryside presents all the characteristics of such societies:
dispersal, low density population, apparent irrationality in the
organisation of social spaces, and a strong cultural otherness. 
As I pointed out at the beginning of this article, settlement
policies began by targeting the Tibetan herders in the
provinces neighbouring the TAR. In the guise of environ-
mental protection, this “emerging form of green governmen-
tality,” as it has been called, (64) allowed the imposition of au-
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thoritarian policies on the grounds of “ecological migration.”
It was also a means of controlling restless populations, or
those evading state control, under the unchallengeable pre-
text of environmental protection. In the TAR, however, such
control is not imposed in the name of ecology, which is
hardly ever mentioned, but rather for the sake of developing
a spirit of enterprise. This could therefore be called “a form
of greed governmentality.” At the back of their minds, the
authorities are also probably betting that a measure of pros-
perity will lead to a weakening of religious feeling: according
to China’s Tibet, in the Tolung Dechen model village “the
farmers and herders [...] are enthusiastically improving pro-
duction, contributing wholeheartedly to their own lift in
lifestyle, rather than only pray for help from Buddha.” (65)C onclus ion
The breadth of this project for social transformation, and the
manner of its enactment, are without precedent in Tibet.
The starting point is the reorganisation of the Tibetan coun-
tryside in purely physical terms, but the ultimate aim is to put
an end to the autarchic non-consumerist way of life of the Ti-
betans, who will be introduced to the “healthy and civilised”
life of the pursuit of profit. Under a different sky and at an-
other time, a similar mindset was called an “illusory hope”
and a “naive representation of social reality and the logic of
its transformation.” (66)
The desire to control those populations that resist being in-
cluded in the self-proclaimed multicultural Chinese nation
probably plays a part in this policy. Nonetheless, one cannot
exclude the possibility that the rulers sincerely wish to im-
prove the lot of the peasants. The TAR has already borne
witness to the pitfalls of such a policy, which was unquestion-
ably concerned with improving daily life but paid no heed to
local conditions and the wishes of those involved. That was
in the 1980s and 1990s, when technicians were sent from
China to train Tibetans in growing vegetables in glass green-
houses. But they forgot that fruit and vegetables make up a
minimal part of the Tibetan diet, that the peasants did not
have sufficient start-up capital, and that, like all practitioners
of autarchic agriculture, they sought “the satisfaction of their
immediate needs, at minimum cost and risk to them-
selves.” (67) Their attitude is quite different from that of the
entrepreneur who seeks to “maximise profit to the detriment
of security.” (68) After several years, large numbers of the Ti-
betan peasants had rented or sold their greenhouses to the
technicians and their associates. Since then, the flourishing
trade in fruit and vegetables in the Lhasa suburbs has be-
come more or less a monopoly controlled by the Hans. (69)
James Scott has shown that, throughout the world, such proj-
ects were bound to fail when they were driven by a desire to
order nature and society, when they arose from an ultra-mod-
ernising ideology serving an authoritarian state prepared to
use coercive methods, and when civil society was unable to
put up any resistance. (70) The case of the “socialist new vil-
lages” in the TAR fulfils these four conditions even more
completely than elsewhere in China, since any sign of oppo-
sition to the policies of the central government is interpreted
as a reflection of separatist tendencies, and this makes civil
society more “prostrate” before the state than in other re-
gions.
A policy aimed at professional training might allow rural Ti-
betans to join the new path that has been imposed on them.
Given the confirmed lack of professional training establish-
ments in the TAR, however, this approach does not appear
to have been explored. (71) Actually, there have been educa-
tional campaigns. For example, at the initiative of the Lhasa
Department of Agriculture and Livestock, 33,000 farmers
and pastoralists attended a course in 2008 on “the scientific
cultivation, breeding method in 60 fields such as planting
grain, vegetables, raising poultry and using agricultural ma-
chinery, ect. [sic].” (72) There was no mention of the length
of the training session, or of the attention to the villagers’
own knowledge (often ignored by “experts”), and even less
of the difficulties that the teachers must have encountered in
dealing with a largely uneducated population. There was just
the announcement that at the end of the training, 94.9 per-
cent of the participants passed the examination, a result that
can only arouse suspicion. Moreover, 87.7 percent of them
were reported to have found a job; but Goldstein has shown
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Village by the roadside, 
Kongpo, TAR. 
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that in 90 percent of the families in his sample selection,
since 2003 at least one person has been looking for non-agri-
cultural income. (73) The reported rate of 87.7 percent of the
peasants employed in the non-agricultural sector may there-
fore simply reflect the already widespread situation in the
countryside, rather than being a sign of the positive achieve-
ments of the course. Finally, this training course cost only
315 yuan per person, with each class containing 120 people,
so the extent and the effectiveness of the training dispensed
are open to doubt. 
Similarly, the impact of a training session announced in
2009 for 12,000 poor peasants and intended to enable them
“to grow vegetabless [sic] and breed livestock more effi-
ciently” needs to be put into perspective. The announced
total cost of five million yuan in fact represents only 415 yuan
per person. (74) Moreover, it is astonishing to see that the
most recent announcement of training provided to Tibetan
farmers has a picture showing Tibetan peasants in matching
over-garments performing “ethnic dances” for tourists. (75)
Not only is this policy going to bring about a rapid loss of ge-
ographical and historical landmarks, it also demands from
those affected an extraordinary adaptive ability. Further-
more, it completely disregards the empirical knowledge and
flexible expertise grounded in a radically different mode of
rural life (the métis described by Scott). It runs the risk of
becoming a source of “violent and brutal disturbance” (76)
rather than of well-being for the life of the Tibetan country-
side.•
• Translated by Jonathan Hall
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